Cobra Effects: How the Education and Training (ECE Reform) Amendment Bill Could Bite Back
“The likely consequences of changes as proposed in the ECE Reform Bill are not good for anyone, least not children, families, and the health and quality of the ECE sector” (Dr Sarah Alexander)
Submission to the Education and Workforce Committee
The Education and Training (ECE Reform) Amendment Bill
Submitted by: Office of Early Childhood Education (OECE)
Date: 29 August 2025
Contents:
Introduction
Summary of Key Concerns
Our Position and Recommendations
Errors and the Bill’s Shortcomings
Closing Statement
Introduction
The Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill is promoted as a solution to improve the effectiveness of the early childhood education (ECE) regulatory system.
During the Bill’s first reading, Hon David Seymour shared the frustrations of ECE service operators he had spoken with—concerns that prompted the Ministry for Regulation review of the ECE regulatory system. He cited issues such as conflicting rules, a dictatorial approach, minor regulations enforced under threat of closure, and inconsistent enforcement. The Bill is positioned as a long-overdue fix for these concerns, though it remains unclear whether the scale or severity of these issues truly warrants a full legislative overhaul.
However, the proposed reforms risk triggering serious unintended consequences—what’s known as the cobra effect, where attempts to solve a problem end up making it worse.
Summary of Key Concerns
Sector Impact
The Bill is designed to reduce regulatory burdens for service providers—particularly those who struggle to understand existing requirements or view current regulations and penalties for non-compliance as unfair to themselves and their business operations.
However, these reforms could backfire on the very providers the Bill aims to support. Looser regulation is likely to attract new entrants driven by commercial interests, potentially forcing high-quality providers to close due to unfair competition. It also risks encouraging more “cowboy” operators—those who cut corners and compromise standards—leading to an increase in poor practice across the sector.
In response to rising risks, the government may feel compelled to introduce reactive measures such as mandatory CCTV surveillance and tighter policing—further shifting the sector away from trust-based, relational care.
As conditions erode, parents may begin to withdraw from formal ECE altogether—choosing instead to leave the workforce, hire nannies, rely on babysitters, or form informal care networks with other families. This will result in vacant places across ECE services, while providers continue to face fixed overheads and mounting financial strain.
Misunderstanding the Purpose of ECE
The Amendment Bill’s stated purpose, objectives, and guiding principles for regulating ECE disregard children’s rights, misrepresent ECE as a substitute for family care, and were drafted without the insight of independent experts. These omissions risk undermining the quality of care and education, eroding parent trust, and destabilising the very foundation of the ECE system.
The Bill reflects a troubling lack of understanding about the true nature and purpose of ECE. It frames ECE as a tool to support the labour market. While enabling parents to participate in the workforce may be a benefit that comes from children attending ECE, it is not its core purpose.
ECE is a vital developmental support for children and families and should be recognised as such—consistent with the definition of “complementary early childhood care and education” established in the last major reform of education administration[1] and reflected today in the Education (Early Childhood Services) Regulations 2008.
Financial and Equity Implications
The financial implications of the Amendment Bill are equally concerning. Redirecting public funding of ECE toward services designed primarily to support labour market participation will inflate costs for government and taxpayers without guaranteeing better outcomes for children.
The Bill is likely to encourage the expansion of long-day childcare facilities while phasing out flexible and part-day education options. This shift will reduce the variety of high-quality ECE services available and deepen inequities—especially for children from disadvantaged home environments.
Children whose parents can’t afford the weekly, year-round cost of long-day care, or who are unable to work due to illness, unemployment, or caregiving responsibilities, may be excluded from ECE altogether. As a result, many children will miss out on important learning and social experiences before starting school—not because their families chose to opt out, but because they simply won’t have the option.
Most alarming are the long-term consequences for children placed in low-quality, institutional care environments— which this Bill will enable. Such settings can lead to developmental harm, with remedial costs borne not only by families but by society. International research consistently shows that high-quality early childhood education—especially when it involves parents in children’s learning and supports families—delivers significant benefits, including improved educational attainment, increased productivity, and reduced public spending on remedial education, healthcare, and criminal justice.
Principles Guiding the Director of Regulation’s Performance, Functions, Duties and Powers
The principles outlined in the Bill—to have regard for children’s health, safety, and wellbeing; their learning and development; and the role of parents in the ECE—are seriously weakened by Cabinet’s support for the Ministry for Regulation’s recommendations to reduce or remove several key licensing criteria and restructure the regulatory framework.
Notably, the principles omit any reference to foundational documents such as Te Whāriki and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child—both essential to quality early childhood education in Aotearoa.
Also concerning is the statement that decision-making by the Director must (i) be risk-based, proportionate, fair, and transparent; and (ii) avoid imposing unnecessary costs on parents, caregivers, and service providers. In practice, “risk-based” and “fair” involve weighing children’s safety, care, and quality of education against cost-cutting measures aimed at reducing operational expenses for providers. This framing sidelines best practices in caregiving and early education in favour of financial efficiency—placing children, families, and ultimately society at risk.
As a result, the principles offer little real assurance that children’s health, safety, and wellbeing will be protected; that even a basic level of education will be provided; or that parents will be actively involved in their child’s learning, supported to raise concerns, and confident those concerns will be properly addressed.
Delegation and Risk of Regulatory Capture
We are particularly concerned that the wording of Section 27E could allow the Director of Regulation to delegate responsibilities to individuals who are not employed by the Ministry or any government agency. These individuals may have financial interests in ECE and could include entities or lobbyists representing specific group interests.
The delegated responsibilities could include conducting inspections, producing regulatory materials, and even managing complaints from parents and the public. Delegating regulatory authority to individuals or entities with vested market interests poses a serious risk of conflict of interest and regulatory capture—undermining public trust, transparency, and the integrity of the ECE system.
By introducing additional layers of bureaucracy and weakening already limited consequences for non-compliance, the Bill creates conditions that enable poorer practices among service providers. These changes increase the risk that harm to children may be overlooked or concealed—protecting business interests, shielding regulators from accountability, and ultimately eroding the foundations of a safe, equitable, and trustworthy ECE sector.
Our Position and Recommendation
Given the omissions and significant risks posed to the sector, taxpayers, children, and families, the Office of Early Childhood Education (OECE) does not support the Education and Training (ECE Reform) Amendment Bill.
We strongly recommend that this poorly conceived Bill not proceed or be approved.
Should you wish to develop sound, evidence-based policy, we are well positioned to provide research, analysis, and expert advice.
May we also point out that coalition partners have already proposed several potentially constructive policy ideas that warrant serious consideration, including:
- Establishing regular, unannounced Ministry of Education compliance spot-checks of ECE services (National Party, 2020, 2023 election promise).
- Increasing unannounced Education Review Office visits (ACT Party, 2023 election promise). Currently, ECE services receive ample notice before a review, allowing time to prepare paperwork and adjust staffing for the day. Unannounced visits would require services to consistently meet ERO’s teaching and learning standards—not just on inspection days
- Reviewing adult-to-infant (under 2s) staffing ratios in ECE centres as an urgent health and safety matter (NZ First, 2023 election promise).
- Introducing regulation to ensure that at all times of the day, at least one adult working with children in teacher-led centres is ECE-trained and fully qualified (National Party, 2023 election promise).
Errors and the Bill’s Shortcomings
Concerns Regarding Omissions
Many essential elements at the heart of high-quality care and education for children within Aotearoa NZ are notably absent from Part 2 Purpose and Objectives in the Bill, and are not reflected in the functions and duties assigned to the Director of Regulation. Notably:
1. Recognition of and commitment to the rights and needs of the child, including:
- The right to affection, love, stable caregiving (low staff turnover), and emotional security
- The right to full and meaningful opportunities for play
- The right of access to the natural environment
- The right of tamariki Māori to their identity, language, and culture
- The right of children with disabilities and additional learning or care needs to access ECE that genuinely meets their needs and interests
2. Recognition of Te Whāriki and the necessity of ECE qualified teachers to ensure appropriate curricula for infants and young children, and to actively partner with parents in children’s care and learning.
3. Support for parents in their primary caregiving role, with a regulatory system that enables ECE provision aligned with parental choice, including the ability to:
- Decide whether and when to re-enter paid employment
- Choose the age at which their child begins ECE and the number of hours accessed
- Pursue further education
- Access rest, leisure, or respite
- Engage in voluntary work or public duties
4. A clear responsibility for the Director of Regulation to monitor and address exclusionary practices, including:
- Child exclusion based on disability, race, class, family background, and other areas of discrimination
- Parent exclusion through methods such as trespass orders or enrolment cancellations following complaints
- A commitment to ensuring inclusion and equity
5. Explicit responsibilities of the Director of Regulation in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi and to New Zealand’s international obligations, including commitments to children’s rights.
These five omissions in the Bill—individually and collectively—signal a troubling shift. Without these protections, children may be placed in environments that fail to meet even the most basic standards of safety, care, and support for learning. The Bill risks steering early childhood education toward a model more akin to “baby farming”—where children are housed rather than nurtured, and where emotional safety, parental involvement, and meaningful learning are sidelined.
Is this truly the vision we hold for our youngest citizens? Shouldn’t ECE services offer more—much more—in return for the government’s financial investment and families’ trust?
Concerns Regarding the Proposed Change to the Purpose of Regulating ECE
The Amendment Bill proposes that the purpose for regulating ECE is to:
“(a) set and implement minimum standards to provide for quality early childhood education that allows children to establish strong foundations for learning, well-being, and life outcomes; and
(b) support the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.”
This revised purpose shifts the focus of ECE regulation toward social welfare and employment outcomes.
The framing echoes a pre-1986 view of childcare—before its transfer from the Department of Social Welfare to the Department of Education—and risks reverting to a model where ECE was seen as little more than supervision, with minimal educational intent.
In contrast, the purpose of regulating ECE is already clearly and appropriately defined in the Education (Early Childhood Services) Regulations, which state:
“The purpose of the minimum standards is to ensure the education, care, health, comfort, and safety of children attending licensed early childhood services.”
Each licensed service provider must comply with each of the following minimum standards:
- the curriculum standard (see regulation 43)
- the qualifications, ratios, and service-size standard (see regulation 44)
- the premises and facilities standard, the health and safety practices standard (see regulation 46)
- the governance, management, and administration standard(see regulation 47).
Moreover, the current wording in the Education and Training Act is both appropriate and non-controversial:
“The purpose of this Part is to regulate an early childhood education system where all children are able to participate and receive a strong foundation for learning, positive well-being, and life outcomes by—
- setting standards to support quality provision and learning; and
- supporting the health, safety, and well-being of children; and
- enabling parental choice by providing for licensing and funding of different types of provision.”
This existing framework rightly centres children’s development and wellbeing, while recognising the role of parental choice in the type of service they select for their child—without reducing ECE to a labour market instrument.
The proposed change to the purpose of regulating ECE is not only unnecessary, but regressive.
Concerns Regarding Purpose of Part 2(a) – Minimum Standards (Do Not) Provide Quality ECE
Clause (a) states the intention to “set and implement minimum standards to provide for quality early childhood education.”
However, this wording is fundamentally flawed. Minimum standards, by definition, establish a baseline for compliance—they do not equate to quality. True quality in early childhood education is a measure of practice that goes beyond regulatory thresholds. It reflects aspiration, responsiveness, and continual improvement.
Framing quality as the outcome of meeting minimum standards risks stripping away ambition and innovation. It encourages uniformity in provision, discourages individualised approaches, and undermines the drive to exceed expectations in service of tamariki and whānau.
Moreover, quality in early childhood education is shaped by cultural values, professional expertise, and the perspectives of children, families, and communities. It cannot be objectively defined by the standards a government requires providers to meet.
Concerns Regarding Purpose of Part 2(b) – Labour Market Participation
Clause (b) of Part 2 states the intention to “support the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.”
We submit that this intention is misplaced within education legislation, as it falls within the domain of social and economic policy. The government already supports parental workforce participation through targeted social policy measures, such as the childcare subsidy administered by the Ministry of Social Development and the FamilyBoost childcare fees rebate administered by Inland Revenue. These mechanisms are more appropriate vehicles for supporting labour market engagement than education legislation.
Education legislation should focus on the child and their education—not on enabling parents to participate in the labour market. This intention also raises a broader concern: what happens in times of high unemployment, when parents cannot find suitable work? The purpose of ECE regulation should not be contingent on labour market conditions.
Framing ECE as a tool to support labour market participation will have significant implications for the funding model, placing substantial pressure on the Government’s Budget for ECE spending.
Past experience—such as the unintended consequences of the 20 Hours Free ECE policy—suggests that providers respond to funding changes by restructuring operations to maximise revenue. Many implemented minimum daily attendance requirements of six hours or more for children aged three and older (to qualify for the six-hour daily funding maximum and add extra hours to charge parent fees). This shift led to an unanticipated budget blowout for government, while families were left covering additional costs for access—regardless of whether the set enrolment hours reflected what was best for children or aligned with family preferences.
Concerns Regarding the Creation of the Director of Regulation Role
The Secretary of Education already possesses the authority and capacity to carry out the functions proposed for the Director of Regulation. The creation of this role is therefore unnecessary.
Moreover, the position description for the Director of Regulation lacks any clear commitment to strengthening regulatory requirements, increasing the frequency of monitoring, or enforcing standards more rigorously. As proposed, the creation of the Director role offers no assurance of improvement to the current system for children and families.
Concerns Regarding Conflicting Statements on Oversight Authority
The Amendment Bill states that the role of the Director of Regulation will sit within the Ministry of Education. However, during the Bill’s first reading, Hon David Seymour stated: “There will also be a change from the Ministry of Education to the Education Review Office as the specialist enforcer.”
This contradiction raises serious concerns about the clarity and intent of the Bill. Currently, the Ministry of Education holds responsibility for licensing and enforcement and has established expertise in overseeing the NZ education system. In contrast, the Education Review Office (ERO) is tasked with evaluating and reporting on education quality—specifically learning and teaching. It does not hold licensing or regulatory enforcement functions for ECE services.
Introducing a new bureaucratic role and potentially shifting enforcement responsibilities to an agency without the relevant mandate or experience undermines regulatory coherence. A more fiscally responsible and operationally sound approach would be to strengthen the accountability of the Secretary of Education—avoiding the significant costs associated with creating a new role, including staffing, IT infrastructure, and administrative overhead. Such changes risk reverberating across the sector, ultimately placing greater financial strain on taxpayers.
Concerns Regarding the Introduction and Implications of Risk-Based Monitoring
The claim that child safety is being prioritised under this Bill is highly questionable. Section 27B refers to “proactive, regular, risk-based monitoring,” yet the Bill provides no definition or framework for how “risk” will be assessed. As proposed, “risk-based monitoring” appears to involve balancing children’s safety and wellbeing against cost-cutting measures in favour of financial efficiency and aimed at reducing operational expenses for service providers.
The absence of clear criteria, opens the door for the Minister or the Director of Regulation to set parameters that may favour certain types of providers—particularly large commercial networks—while subjecting smaller, not-for-profit, or less politically connected services to disproportionate scrutiny. Without safeguards, monitoring could be applied selectively, reinforcing power imbalances and undermining trust in the regulatory system.
Moreover, it is often in services that invest heavily in cultivating reputations for trust where breaches, when they occur, are most devastating—precisely because they go unnoticed or unchallenged. When oversight is inconsistent or biased, harm can occur behind closed doors, leaving children and families vulnerable.
Most concerning is the absence of any reference to children’s rights. In a sector that directly affects child welfare and education—where young children are especially vulnerable—and given New Zealand’s status as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), this omission is unacceptable.
Concerns Regarding the Independence of the Director of Regulation
The Bill states that certain functions of the Director of Regulation must be performed independently of any influence from the Minister of Education. However, it does not clarify whether this independence extends to the interests or influence of the Minister for Regulation.
The Director of Regulation is not statutorily independent, and the scope of ministerial influence remains ambiguous. In a sector as critical as early childhood education—where regulatory decisions directly affect children’s safety, learning, and wellbeing—this lack of clarity is concerning.
Concerns Regarding the Principles Guiding the Director’s Performance, Functions, Duties, and Powers
Section 27D of the Amendment Bill outlines principles intended to guide the Director of Regulation, including:
- the health, safety, and well-being of children receiving ECE is paramount
- the learning and development of those children is essential and supports their readiness to transition to school
- the role of parents and caregivers in the ECE of their children is recognised and supported
- principles of good regulatory practice, including decision-making that is risk-based, proportionate, fair, and transparent, and avoids imposing unnecessary costs on parents, caregivers, and service providers
While these principles may appear sound at first glance, they are significantly undermined by Cabinet’s support for the Ministry for Regulation’s recommendations to remove key licensing criteria and restructure the regulatory framework. These changes include the reduction or removal of criteria related to curriculum, governance, and management—including requirements for parent involvement, transparency in service operations, and HR practices in ECE environments.
The directive to avoid imposing “unnecessary costs” on service providers may be interpreted in ways that compromise these very principles. It could be used to justify cutting corners—especially if a service provider claims that essential safeguards are too expensive.
In addition, several important elements or areas are not in the list of principles (see page 5 of this submission for details). As a result, the principles guiding the Director are more symbolic than enforceable. They offer little genuine assurance that children’s health, safety, and wellbeing will be protected; that even a basic standard of education will be delivered; or that parents will be meaningfully involved in their child’s learning, supported to raise concerns, and confident those concerns will be properly addressed.
Concerns Regarding Delegation of Director’s Functions, Duties, and Powers
Section 27E of the Bill enables the Director of Regulation to delegate certain functions, duties, and powers to individuals who are not employees of the Ministry, provided the Secretary for Education agrees and the delegation is for a specified period.
However, the Bill does not specify which powers may be delegated, under what circumstances delegation would be necessary (e.g. ministry staff shortage), or the maximum duration for such delegation. These omissions leave the provision open to broad interpretation—subject to the discretion, and potentially the unconscious or preferential bias, of whoever holds the Director role at any given time.
We are particularly concerned that Section 27E would allow the Director to delegate responsibilities and powers to individuals who are not employed by the government or the Ministry. This could include tasks such as conducting inspections, producing regulatory materials, and even managing complaints from parents and the public. These individuals may have financial interests in ECE and could include entities or lobbyists representing specific group interests—for example, delegating responsibilities to “peak bodies,” as requested in a group’s submission to the Ministry for Regulation.
Delegating regulatory authority to individuals or entities with vested market interests poses a serious risk of conflict of interest and regulatory capture—undermining public trust, accountability, and the integrity of the ECE system.
Closing Statement
The Office of Early Childhood Education urges the Education and Workforce Committee and all Members of Parliament not to support the Education and Training (ECE Reform) Amendment Bill to be passed into law.
While the Bill is positioned as a solution to regulatory inefficiencies, it is likely to trigger serious unintended consequences: undermining child safety and education, eroding public trust, and destabilising the sector.
The Bill conflates economic objectives with educational purpose, reframing ECE as a tool for labour market participation rather than a developmental support for children and families.
This shift distorts the intent of education legislation and risks significantly inflating public costs. It also threatens to reduce the diversity of ECE service options and undermine equitable access for families.
The creation of a new Director of Regulation role introduces unnecessary bureaucracy, duplicates existing functions, and lacks statutory independence.
The vague promise of “risk-based monitoring” opens the door to selective scrutiny and regulatory capture, favouring large commercial providers, or those who are politically influential.
Furthermore, Cabinet’s decisions to reduce or remove key licensing criteria—such as those related to curriculum, governance, caregiving practices, and the prominent display of complaints procedures—undermine the principles outlined in Section 27D. Without these safeguards, the Bill’s stated commitment to child safety, wellbeing, and parental involvement becomes symbolic rather than substantive.
ECE is a sector that demands clarity, integrity, and child-centred policy. This Bill, as drafted, fails to deliver on those imperatives. We strongly recommend that it not proceed.
Should you wish to pursue meaningful reform that delivers genuine improvements, OECE is ready to provide expert guidance and evidence-based insights to help shape a stronger, more child-centred early childhood education system. Children deserve care, protection, and education that reflects their inherent value and potential.
We urge you to put children’s rights, education, and wellbeing at the heart of any future reform.
We also encourage consideration of constructive policy proposals already put forward by government coalition partners, including increased unannounced service inspections, improved staffing ratios for infants, and stronger qualification requirements.
[1] Meade, A. (Chair). (1988). Education to be More: Report of the Early Childhood Care and Education Working Group. Wellington: Government Printer.
