ECE Newsroom

The transfer of early childhood education regulatory functions from the Ministry of Education to the Education Review Office did not include the transfer of any regional Ministry regulatory staff.

Previously there were 94 positions dedicated to ECE regulatory work in the Ministry of Education (see the interactive graph below).

The Office of Early Childhood Education (OECE) says the revelation contradicts public messaging that regulatory functions were simply being “shifted” from MoE to ERO. OECE says stakeholders were not told that the entire regulatory workforce would be disestablished rather than moved.

Associate Education Minister David Seymour said transferring regulatory functions from the Ministry of Education (MoE) to the Education Review Office (ERO) would create clearer education roles. But in at least one area – ECE funding approvals – the change has delivered the opposite: a split, two‑agency system.

Several early childhood education (ECE) funding approvals have now been redirected to ERO, creating a process the Office of Early Childhood Education (OECE) says is more complicated and less efficient than the Government originally signalled.

A major ownership change in New Zealand’s early childhood education (ECE) sector has highlighted a regulatory gap that allows companies to acquire large numbers of centres without triggering government oversight, fit‑and‑proper checks, or licence reassessment. Both organisations continue operating under their existing structures, the acquisition illustrates how corporate consolidation in the ECE sector can occur largely out of public view and without regulatory intervention.

This story uncovers how a chemical‑burn incident at a Kindercare centre was not just a one‑off mistake but the result of systemic failures in safety, oversight, and regulation.

See how both WorkSafe and the Ministry of Education allowed these risks to go unchecked, and what it means for children’s safety in ECE.

The Problems Included:

1. Unsafe chemical storage: Industrial sanitiser was stored under the kitchen sink next to general dishwashing liquid, in similar‑looking containers with similar labels.

2. Poor activity planning: Staff began the activity without enough detergent, leading to trips back to the centre (where a teacher collected a container they believed was dishwashing liquid) and to the dairy (where the centre manager went to buy more).

3. No RAMS was completed: The water‑slide activity was known about the day before and parents were informed so children would bring clothing for wet play, yet the centre did not complete a risk assessment of the activity.

4. Use of unlicensed outdoor space: The centre routinely used a grass section outside the gate as an outdoor activity area, despite it not being licensed or approved.

5. No one questioned the container of industrial sanitiser: When the chemical was taken from the kitchen, and again when it was poured onto the slide, no staff member or the manager involved in the activity noticed or challenged the container.

6. Long‑term regulatory lack of oversight: The Ministry of Education had not conducted a full compliance assessment of the Kindercare centre since 2011.